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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
MATTHEW JAMES HINMON, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20150015-CA 
Appellant is not incarcerated. 
INTRODUCTION 
The State charged Matthew Hinman (Matthew) with possession of a controlled 
substance and interference with an arresting officer. Matthew moved to suppress the 
evidence that he possessed a controlled substance on the ground that it was the fruit of 
unreasonable seizure of his person in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that there was no 
Fourth Amendment violation. As a result, Matthew pleaded guilty as charged, reserving 
the right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress on appeal. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103 (2)(e). See 
Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment); R.224-26. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, & PRESERVATION 
Issue I: Whether the trial court erred when it denied Matthew's motion to suppress 
evidence that was the fruit of an unconstitutional seizure. 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews "a trial court's decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation as a mixed question of 
law and fact." State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ,r 17, 332 P.3d 937. "While the [trial] court's 
factual findings are reviewed for clear error, its legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness, including its application oflaw to the facts of the case." Id. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R.31-33, 64-77, 143-53, 156-63, 170-93, 
283,284. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following are attached at Addendum B: U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Matthew with possession of a controlled substance (possession) 
and interference with an arresting officer (interference). R.1-3. Matthew moved to 
suppress the evidence that he possessed a controlled substance on the ground that it was 
the fruit of an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. R.31-33, 64-
77; 283:3-7. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that there was no Fourth 
Amendment violation. R.170-93. As a result, Matthew pleaded guilty to possession and 
interference, reserving the right to challenge the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress on appeal. R.194-95, 204, 211-12, 224-26. He timely appeals. R.238-39. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Background 
On September 19, 2013, Raymond Loken was working as a security guard at a 
Harmon's grocery store in Draper. R.284:28-29, 36; 285:3. Loken worked security for 
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Harmon's part-time; he was also a full-time peace officer with the Utah Division of 
Wildlife Resources. R.284:28-29; 285:2-3. The Harmon's was located in a "reasonably 
nice" part of town. R.284:36. Loken's uniform and utility belt gave him the appearance 
of a police officer. R.284:31; 285:6, 12. 
The manager at Harmon's, Craig Worthington, asked Loken to meet with him and 
an employee, Mark Raines, who "had reported some suspicious activity on the west side 
of the store." R.284:29; see also R.284:15; 285:3. Loken met with Worthington and 
Raines near the west entrance of the store. R.284:15, 24, 29. 
There, Raines told Loken and Worthington that he thought there might be a drug 
deal occurring on the west side of the parking lot. R.284:6, 29, 37; 285:3. He said he saw 
two people in a green car that was backed into a parking space adjacent to a sidewalk 
running along the west side of the store. R.284:15, 24, 29-30. He said he stared at the 
people because he thought they appeared suspicious. R.177; 285:4. Raines said that when 
the passenger noticed him staring, he gave Raines a "'what are you looking at' kind of a 
look" or actually said something to the effect of, "'what are you looking at?"' R.177; 
284:29; 285:4. Raines said he saw a towel on the passenger's lap with pink balloons on it 
and the passenger was "fiddling" with the balloons. R.177; 284:29. Loken said, "[W]ell, 
let's go out and see what's going on." R.177; 285:4. 
Loken approached the car from the rear on the passenger side. R.284:15-16, 30. 
Worthington was close behind, and Raines was behind Worthington. R.284:17-18, 30. 
The front passenger window of the car was down. R.284:30; 285:11. As Loken looked 
into the car over the passenger's shoulder, he saw a towel on the passenger's lap. 
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R.284:31; 285:5, 10. The passenger was fiddling with something over the towel, but 
Loken couldn't see exactly what he was doing, and he couldn't see any balloons. 
R.284:31; 285:5, 10. As he leaned in to get a closer look, the driver noticed him. 
R.284:31; 285:5. The passenger then looked back at him "with a real deer in the 
headlights look." R.284:31. At that point, Loken said something to the effect of, "'Police 
officer. Don't move."' R.284:31-32; cf R.284:15-16, 19-20, 34; 285:11. 
There was a momentary hesitation. R.284:32. Then the passenger bent forward 
and pushed everything in his lap to the floor of the car. R.284:16, 20, 32; 285:6. Loken's 
immediate thought was that the passenger was either hiding contraband or retrieving a 
weapon. R.284:32; 285:6. Loken dove halfway into the car through the window, tried to 
get ahold of the passenger's hands down near the floor, and repeatedly told the passenger 
that he was under arrest and to stop resisting. R.284:16, 20, 33; 285:6-8, 14. Loken 
restrained the passenger's left hand, but the passenger was able to free his right hand. 
R.284:33; 285:7-8. The passenger said "start the car," "drive," and "take off," and he 
appeared to be reaching for the gearshift. R.284:16, 21, 33; 285:7. Loken told the driver 
not to start the car. R.284:33; 285:7. The driver put her hands up, signaling that she 
would not try to drive. R.284:21, 33; 285:7-8. Worthington came around to the driver's 
side and removed the keys from the ignition. R.284:16, 21; 285:7-8. 
The passenger door of the car was damaged and couldn't be opened. R.284:16, 21; 
285:6-7. As Loken continued to struggle to restrain the passenger through the window, 
the passenger reached toward the driver with a clenched fist and said, "Eat this." 
R.284:33; 285:8. Loken told the driver not to eat it, and she complied. R.284:33; 285:8. 
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The passenger then used his legs to push the upper half of his body in between the front 
seats and into the backseat area. R.284:22, 33-34; 285:8. Worthington noticed the 
passenger trying to put something in his mouth, and then he saw a pink balloon drop onto 
the backseat. R.284:16-17, 22. Worthington picked it up and held onto it. R.284:22, 25. 
Worthington then helped Loken put handcuffs on the passenger. R.284: 17, 23, 34, 36; 
285:8-9. 
The police arrived ten or fifteen minutes later. R.284:34. The contents of the 
balloon field-tested positive for heroin. R.285: 15. The passenger was identified as 
Matthew. See R.285:18-19. 
B. Procedural History 
The State charged Matthew with possession and interference. R.1-3. Matthew 
moved to suppress the evidence that he possessed heroin on the ground that it was the 
fruit of an unreasonable seizure of his person in violation of the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. R.31-33, 64-77; 283:3-7. 
The trial court denied Matthew's motion to suppress. R.170-93. Based on the 
State's stipulation, the trial court concluded that Loken and Worthington were 
government actors such that the Fourth Amendment applied to their conduct. R.146, 183. 
It also concluded that Raines was merely a citizen-informant and not a government actor, 
so the Fourth Amendment did not apply to his conduct. R.183. The court went on to 
conclude that Loken's initial seizure of Matthew-when Loken said, "don't move"-was 
an investigatory detention that was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion. R.185-
88, 192. It concluded that Loken's physical restraint of Matthew-when Loken dove into 
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the car window to grab Matthew's hands and told him he was under arrest-constituted 
an arrest that was supported by probable cause. R.188-90, 192. Thus, the court ruled that 
both ofLoken's seizures of Matthew were reasonable and the evidence of the heroin was 
therefore not the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation. R.192. 
Based on the trial court's ruling, Matthew entered Sery pleas to possession and 
interference, reserving the right to challenge the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress on appeal. R.194-95, 204, 211-12, 224-26; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 110) ("a 
defendant may enter conditional plea of guilty ... reserving in the record the right, on 
appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-
trial motion"); State v. Lopes, 2001 UT 85, if7 n.3, 34 P.3d 762 (explaining that 
conditional guilty pleas are sometimes called "Sery pleas"). He timely appeals. R.238-39. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Loken 
performed an investigatory detention of Matthew when he said, "Police, don't move." He 
arrested Matthew when he attempted to restrain Matthew's hands and told him he was 
under arrest. Neither the investigatory detention nor the arrest were reasonable. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, an investigatory detention is not justified unless the 
officer has reasonable suspicion that the detainee is engaged in criminal activity. 
Reasonable suspicion can be based on an informant's tip if the tip is sufficiently reliable 
and detailed and the officer confirms it. Ultimately, an investigatory detention is justified 
if the tip, together with the officer's observations, creates reasonable suspicion. The State 
bears the burden of proving reasonable suspicion. 
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Loken performed an investigatory detention of Matthew when he said, "Police, 
don't move," but he did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion. Loken's basis for 
temporarily detaining Matthew was primarily Raines's tip. Raines had reported that 
Matthew was sitting in the car with the driver; that the car was backed into the parking 
stall; that when Raines stared at Matthew and the driver, Matthew gave him a "what are 
you looking at?" kind of look or actually said, "what are you looking at?"; that Matthew 
had a towel on his lap; that there were pink balloons on the towel; that Matthew was 
manipulating the balloons; and that Raines believed that Matthew and the driver were 
engaged in a drug transaction. 
Raines's tip was unreliable because there was no evidence that he had a sufficient 
basis of knowledge for concluding that the occupants of the car were engaged in drug 
activity. Raines's tip was insufficiently detailed because there was no evidence he told 
Loken that the balloons appeared to contain anything and there was no evidence that 
Loken knew that balloons are associated with drugs. Given that Raines's tip was 
insufficiently reliable and insufficiently detailed, whether Loken confirmed it is 
irrelevant. 
The only fact Loken observed that added to Raines's tip was that the driver and 
Matthew gave Loken, who resembled a police officer, startled looks when they noticed 
him sneaking up behind them. This fact cannot contribute at all to reasonable suspicion. 
On numerous occasions, the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have held that turning to 
look at an officer and acting nervously or excitedly does not contribute to reasonable 
suspicion even when the person is expecting the officer to approach. A startled look is 
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even less suspicious when the person is surprised by an officer sneaking up from behind. 
Indeed, the natural reaction to anyone sneaking up from behind-let alone a stranger who 
appears to be a police officer-is a startled look. Because Raines's tip did not supply 
Loken with reasonable suspicion and Loken 's observations contributed nothing to 
reasonable suspicion, Loken did not have reasonable suspicion to tempora1ily detain 
Matthew. 
Under the Fomth Amendment, an a1Test is not justified unless the anesting officer 
has probable cause to believe that the aITestee is engaged in criminal activity. As with 
reasonable suspicion, probable cause can be based on an informant's tip. Ultimately, an 
aITest is justified if the tip, together with the officer's observations, creates probable 
cause. The State bears the burden of proving probable cause. 
Loken arrested Matthew when he attempted to restrain Matthew's hands and told 
him he was under anest. As already explained, Raines' s tip and the startled looks from 
the driver and Matthew did not even give Loken reasonable suspicion, let alone probable 
cause, by the time Loken told Matthew not to move. Between telling Matthew not to 
move and arresting him, Loken's only observation was that Matthew pushed the towel 
that was on his lap down towards the floor of the car. Utah appellate courts have 
repeatedly held that such movements do not create probable cause or even reasonable 
suspicion. Loken's belief that Matthew was hiding contraband or reaching for a weapon 
was a mere hunch or inchoate suspicion, not a particular fact or particular inference that 
created probable cause to arrest. Therefore, Loken did not have probable cause to an-est 
Matthew. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred when it denied Matthew's motion to suppress 
evidence that was the fruit of an unconstitutional seizure. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits ''unreasonable 
searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. It applies to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; State v. Talbot, 
2010 UT App 352, iJ6, 246 P.3d 112 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)). 
Generally, "evidence obtained in unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is excluded from criminal proceedings." State v. Harker, 2010 UT 
56, ,II 7,240 P.3d 780; see also State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, iJ42, 164 P.3d 397 
("When applicable, the exclusionary rule keeps out of trial evidence primarily or 
derivatively obtained through a violation of an individual's constitutional rights (the 
'fruit' of unconstitutional police conduct)."). 
A "'seizure' triggering the Fourth Amendment's protections occurs only when 
government actors have, 'by means of physical force or show of authority, ... in some 
way restrained the liberty of a citizen." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 
(1989). The Fourth Amendment contemplates three types of encounter between peace 
officers and citizens. See State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, iJ8, 194 P.3d 925. "'A level one 
encounter occurs when a [peace] officer approaches a citizen and asks questions, but the 
person is not detained against his will and remains free to leave."' Id. A '"level two 
encounter"' occurs when a peace officer '"temporarily seizes an individual."' Id. A level 
two encounter is sometimes called an "investigative detention." See Worwood, 2007 UT 
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47, ,I,123-24. "'Finally, a level three stop occurs when a [peace] officer ... effects an 
arrest of the suspect.'" Applegate, 2008 UT 63, ,18. 
Of these three types of encounter, only investigative detentions and arrests 
constitute seizures that must be reasonable to survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny. State 
v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ,134, 63 P.3d 650. For an investigative detention to be 
reasonable, the officer must have "reasonable, articulable suspicion that the [detainee] 
has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ,123 
(internal quotation marks omitted) ( emphasis added). A reasonable arrest, on the other 
hand, requires that the officer have "'probable cause to believe "' that the arrestee is 
engaged in criminal activity. State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, ,110, 147 P.3d 425 (emphasis 
added). 
"It has long been the law that once a defendant adequately challenges a 
warrantless seizure, the State bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of law 
enforcement's action." Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ,139. "In order to meet his initial burden of 
production, a defendant seeking to suppress evidence must articulate how law 
enforcement's action infringed the Fourth Amendment." Id. "Once a valid constitutional 
challenge is made, the burden shifts to the State to prove that its warrantless action was 
justified." Id. ,140. 
In a Fourth Amendment case, an appellate court reviews the trial court's factual 
findings for clear error. State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ,II 7, 332 P.3d 937. It reviews the 
trial court's legal conclusions, including its application of law to the facts of the case, for 
correctness. Id. 
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In this case, the trial court incorrectly concluded that Loken had reasonable 
suspicion to temporarily detain Matthew when Loken said something to the effect of, 
"Police, don't move." It also incorrectly concluded that Loken had probable cause to 
arrest Matthew when Loken reached into the car to restrain Matthew's hands and told 
Matthew that he was under arrest. As a preliminary matter, however, the trial court's 
written ruling contains four clearly erroneous findings of fact that should be corrected. 1 
A. The trial court's ruling contains four clearly erroneous findings of fact. 
An appellate court will set aside a trial court's factual finding as "clearly 
erroneous" if the finding is "against the clear weight of the evidence" or if the appellate 
court otherwise reaches "a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
Brown v. State, 2013 UT 42, ,r37, 308 P.3d 486 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, 
the trial court's ruling contains four findings of fact that are against the clear weight of 
the evidence. 
First, the trial court found that Raines told Loken and Worthington that he 
believed the car Matthew was in was backed into the parking stall "for a quick get-away." 
R.186-87. While there was evidence that Raines said the car was backed into the parking 
stall, there was no evidence that he said anything about it being for "a quick get-away." 
R.284:15, 24, 30. In fact, outside of the trial court's ruling, there is no mention of "a 
1 Matthew doesn't challenge the trial court's conclusion that Raines was not a 
government actor subject to the Fourth Amendment. See R.183. Nor does he challenge 
the trial court's conclusion that Loken performed an investigatory detention-not an 
arrest-when he initially ordered Matthew not to move. R.185. 
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quick get-away" or anything of the sort anywhere in the record. Thus, the trial court's 
"quick get-away" finding is clearly erroneous and this Court should disregard it. 
Second, the trial court found that Raines told Loken and Worthington that he 
believed the balloons contained drugs and that a drug transaction was occurring "based 
upon his experience." R.186-87. There was no evidence that Raines said anything about 
his experience to Loken and Worthington. There was some evidence that Raines told 
Loken and Worthington that he "assumed" the balloons contained heroin, but he never 
said that assumption was based on his experience. R.284:24-25. Notably, Raines testified 
that his only experience with narcotics came from "TV" and an incident "many years 
ago" in which he was cited for "marijuana paraphernalia." R.284:4. He expressly testified 
that he believed a drug transaction was occurring even though he didn't "have much 
experience in that or anything." R.284: 10. The most important point here, however, is 
that there was no evidence that Raines ever mentioned his experience to Loken and 
Worthington. Therefore, the trial court clearly erred when it found that Raines told Loken 
and Worthington that he believed drug activity was occurring "based upon his 
experience." R.186-87. 
Third, the trial court found that Loken did not identify himself as a police officer 
when he commanded Matthew not to move immediately after Matthew noticed him. 
R.174-75. At the preliminary hearing, Loken testified, "I told him, there was two things I 
said; one was don't move and don't do anything stupid. And I was in uniform, the 
Harmon's uniform, it's not the uniform I wear now-," at which point Loken was 
interrupted by the prosecutor asking how the Harmon's uniform looked. R.285:6. 
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Additionally, Worthington wrote in his written statement to police that Loken said, "don't 
move your hands." Defendant's Ex. B. However, in neither instance did Loken or 
Worthington say that Loken did not identify himself as a police officer. R.285 :6; 
Defendant's Ex. B. And at the evidentiary hearing they both emphatically testified that 
Loken did identify himself as a police officer. R.284: 16 (Worthington testifying that 
Loken "said something like, Stop, put your hands down, police, or police, put your hands 
down"), 18-20 (Worthington's testimony clarifying that Loken did identify himself as a 
police officer), 31-32 (Loken's testimony clarifying that he said, "Police," just before he 
said, "'don't move"'). Thus, the evidence is clear that Loken identified himself as a 
police officer, saying something to the effect of, "Police, don't move." R.284: 16, 18-20, 
31-32. Therefore, the trial court clearly erred when it found that Loken did not identify 
himself as a police officer when he initially told Matthew not to move. R.174-75. 
The trial court's fourth and final clearly erroneous finding pertained to the timing 
of events. The trial court found that Matthew reached for the gearshift and told the driver 
to "take off' and 'just drive" before Loken went into the car to restrain Matthew's hands 
and effect an arrest. R.178, 189-90. In support of this finding, the court evidently relied 
on the following testimony from Worthington: 
A: At that point the passenger moved forward, shoved everything that was in his 
lap to the ground and started yelling to the driver to take off, take off. 
Q: Okay. So what happened next? 
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A: He started screaming, Take off, take off, and it looked like he was reaching 
for the gearshift or whatever. So I ran around to the driver's side, removed the 
keys from the ignition, put them in my pocket. 
R.284: 16. But Worthington then clarified, "At this time Mr. Loken was basically halfway 
in the car, him and the passenger were down towards the passenger's feet wrestling 
around with whatever was in the passenger's hand." R.284: 16. He later testified that 
when Matthew "lurched forward," "Loken kept telling him to stop, I'm police, stop, you 
need to quit resisting, quit resisting," and that Loken was "struggling" with Matthew and 
telling him to "stop resisting arrest" while Worthington was "going back and forth from 
the driver's side of the car." R.284:20. Furthermore, in Worthington's written statement 
to police, he said that Loken stated, "your [sic] under arrest give me your hands," before 
Matthew "turned to the Driver and said 'eat it, eat it' [and] 'start your car, go, go."' 
Defendant's Ex. B. 
Moreover, Loken's own testimony was clear and unambiguous that he reached 
into the car to restrain Matthew's hands before Matthew said things like "take off' and 
''just drive." R.284:32-33; 285:6-8, 12-15. At the preliminary hearing, Loken testified 
that he "went to grab" Matthew's hands and said, "'Police, you are under arrest," "right . 
. . when [Matthew] shoved his hands down between his knees." R.285:14-15; see also 
R.284:6-8 {Loken testifying that he reached in to control Matthew's hands "as soon as" 
Matthew "went to the floor"). And at the evidentiary hearing, Loken testified that when 
Matthew drove his hands towards the floor, Loken "almost instantaneously" "reached in 
to grab them." R.284:32-33. It wasn't until after Loken and Matthew struggled for a 
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moment near the floor of the car that Matthew reached up and told the driver to "eat this" 
and "start the car." R.284:33. 
Tellingly, the trial court itself found that Loken reached into the car to grab 
Matthew "[a]s soon as [Matthew] lunged for the floor, pushing everything off his lap." 
R.178. It found that Matthew said to the driver, "'Start the car! Start the car! Go! Go!"', 
while Matthew and Loken were already struggling. R.1 78-79. Thus, the trial court's own 
factual findings on the timing of events appear to be inconsistent. The trial court also 
found that Matthew simultaneously shoved his hands toward the floor and reached for the 
gearshift, which would have been impossible to do. R.178. Thus, the clear weight of the 
evidence shows that Matthew told the driver to ''just drive" and "take off' and reached 
towards the gearshift after Loken reached into the car to restrain Matthew's hands and 
told him he was under arrest. R.284:16, 20, 32-33; 285:6-8, 12-15; Defendant's Ex. B. 
The trial court's finding to the contrary is clearly erroneous. 
In sum, the following factual findings are clearly erroneous: 
1. Raines told Loken and Worthington that he believed the car Matthew was in 
was backed into the parking stall "for a quick get-away." R.186-87. 
2. Raines told Loken and Worthington that he believed the balloons contained 
drugs and that a drug transaction was occurring "based upon his experience." 
R.186-87. 
3. Loken did not identify himself as a police officer when he told Matthew 
"don't move" immediately after Matthew noticed him. R.174-75. 
4. Matthew reached for the gearshift and told the driver to "take off' and "just 
drive" before Loken went into the car to restrain Matthew's hands and effect an 
arrest. R.178, 189-90. 
Therefore, this Court should disregard them. 
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B. Loken lacked reasonable suspicion when he performed an investigatory detention of 
Matthew by identifying himself as a police officer and ordering Matthew not to move. 
An investigatory detention occurs when a peace officer '"temporarily seizes an 
individual."' Applegate, 2008 UT 63, iJ8; Worwood, 2007 UT 4 7, ,r,r23-24. Under the 
Fourth Amendment, an investigatory detention "is justified only if there is a reasonable 
suspicion that [the person detained] is involved in criminal activity." State v. Kohl, 2000 
UT 35, ,r11, 999 P.2d 7. "Police must be able to point to specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the 
intrusion." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] police officer's subjective intent 
and thoughts are irrelevant to the reasonable suspicion inquiry .... " Applegate, 2008 UT 
63, ,r17. Instead, "whether reasonable suspicion exists [is] based upon the facts known to 
the police officer at the time of the" detention. Id. "Evidence discovered after the 
[detention] cannot be considered." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1138 n.6 (Utah 1994). 
"To determine reasonableness, a court should question whether the facts available 
to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate." State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, 
if 14, 78 P.3d 590 (internal quotation marks omitted). "[D]ue weight must be given, not to 
an officer's inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but to specific reasonable 
inferences which an officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience." 
Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Courts look to the "totality of facts 
and circumstances ... to determine if there are sufficient specific and articulable facts to 
support reasonable suspicion." Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ,r11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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"The burden of establishing those articulable facts falls on the State." Id.; see also 
Worwood, 2007 UT 4 7, iJ23 ("When challenged, the state has the burden of proving the 
reasonableness of the officer's actions during an investigative detention."). 
"Reasonable suspicion may be based upon a[n informant's] tip." State v. Rose, 
2015 UT App 49, ,IIO, 345 P.3d 757. "An informant's tip creates reasonable suspicion if 
the information (1) is reliable, (2) provides sufficient detail of the criminal activity, and 
(3) is confirmed by the investigating officer." Id. 
Here, Loken effected an investigatory detention of Matthew when he said, "Police, 
don't move," just after Matthew noticed him approaching from behind. Loken's basis for 
temporarily detaining Matthew was primarily Raines's tip. Raines had reported that 
Matthew was sitting in the car with the driver; that the car was backed into the parking 
stall; that when Raines stared at Matthew and the driver, Matthew gave him a "what are 
you looking at?" kind of look or actually said, "what are you looking at?"; that Matthew 
had a towel on his lap; that there were pink balloons on the towel; that Matthew was 
manipulating the balloons; and that Raines believed that Matthew and the driver were 
engaged in a drug transaction. R.177; 284:6, 15, 24, 29-30, 37; 285:3-4. 
Raines's tip was unreliable. In determining whether an informant's tip is 
sufficiently reliable to support reasonable suspicion, the Court looks to "the indicia of 
veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge as nonexclusive elements to be evaluated in 
reaching the practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances, 
reasonable suspicion ... exists." State v. Lloyd, 2011 UT App 323, ifl5, 263 P.3d 557 
(internal quotation marks omitted). In Lloyd, this Court assessed the reliability of an 
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informant's tip that the occupants of a car were '"smoking drugs."' Id. ,I,I15-17. The 
Court noted that the informant was an identified and disinterested citizen, so her tip bore 
some indicia of reliability. Id. ,Il6. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the tip was 
unreliable because the Court "simply d[id] not have enough information before [it] to 
detennine whether the informant had a sufficient basis of knowledge for concluding that 
the occupants of the car were 'smoking drugs."' Id. ,II 7. The Comi reasoned that 
"whether a person is 'smoking drugs' does not seem to fall within the realm of 
knowledge common to members of the public, unlike the ability to recognize the 
behavior or driving pattern of someone who is intoxicated." Id. 
As in Lloyd, Raines's tip was unreliable because there was no evidence that he 
"had a sufficient basis of knowledge for concluding that the occupants of the car" were 
engaged in drug activity. Id. ,II 7. There was no evidence that the balloons Raines saw 
appeared to contain anything-he described the balloons only as being "pink" and 
"little." R.284:4, 6, 8-10, 24-25, 29, 37. Moreover, there was no evidence that Raines had 
any knowledge of an association between balloons and drugs. Indeed, Raines testified 
that he didn't "have much experience" with drugs, only what he saw on "TV" and an 
incident "many years ago" in which he was cited for "marijuana paraphernalia." R.284:4, 
10. There was no evidence that this paucity of experience taught Raines anything about 
an association between balloons and drugs. And any such association "does not seem to 
fall within the realm of knowledge common to members of the public." Lloyd, 2011 UT 
App 323, ,Il 7; cf DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (rejecting the state's claim that "it 
is a well known fact that heroin is kept in balloons"). Balloons are typically associated 
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with licit uses, such filling them with various legal substances (e.g., air, helium gas, 
water, flour, or sand) or otherwise using them for arts and crafts. There is "no indication 
in the record as to why [Raines] believed that" the balloons contained anything at all, let 
alone drugs. Lloyd, 2011 UT App 323, ,JI 7. In short, the State failed to prove that 
Raines's report of criminal activity was reliable. See Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ,II I; Lloyd, 2011 
UT App 323, ,Il7. 
Not only was Raines's tip unreliable, it was also not sufficiently detailed to 
support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The fact that Matthew responded to 
Raines's stare with a "what are you looking at?" kind oflook or by actually saying "what 
are you looking at?" cannot support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. That is a 
normal response to a stare from a stranger. The fact that the car was backed into the 
parking stall is completely innocuous; people often back their cars into parking stalls 
because it makes pulling out of the stall easier. Although Raines told Loken he saw 
balloons on a towel on Matthew's lap, Raines didn't tell Loken anything about the 
characteristics of the balloons other than that they were "pink" and "little." R.284:4, 6, 8-
10, 24-25, 29, 37. Raines didn't tell Loken whether the balloons were inflated or 
uninflated, whether they were empty or contained something. And there was no evidence 
that Loken knew-from training and experience or otherwise--that balloons or towels 
are indicative of criminal activity. See DeLao, 550 S.W.2d at 291 (holding that seeing a 
balloon did not provide an officer with probable cause because the officer's testimony did 
not demonstrate that he knew that "heroin is kept in balloons" or that he was 
"immediately aware that heroin was in the balloon at the time of the seizure"); Flores v. 
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State, 756 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) ("Heroin inside of a balloon is not within 
plain view so as to warrant its seizure by police without a warrant absent testimony that 
the officer knew that heroin was in the balloon or that balloons frequently are used to 
carry narcotics."); cf People v. Lingo, 806 P.2d 949, 952 (Colo. 1991) (holding that 
seeing a balloon provided a correctional officer with reasonable suspicion where the 
officer "testified that he knew from his fourteen years of work experience at the 
correctional facility that balloons were commonly used to carry contraband into the 
facility"). Indeed, Loken was a peace officer with the Utah Division of Wildlife 
Resources, and there was no evidence that he had ever investigated or been trained in 
investigating drug crimes. See R.284:28-29; 285:2-3. In sum, the State failed to prove 
that Raines's tip was sufficiently detailed to give Loken reasonable suspicion that 
Matthew was engaged in criminal activity. See Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ill 1. 
Raines's tip was insufficiently reliable and insufficiently detailed to support 
reasonable suspicion, so Loken's corroboration of it is irrelevant. See Salt Lake City v. 
Street, 2011 UT App 111, ifl4, 251 P.3d 862 (explaining that officer corroboration "is 
relevant to the extent that it strengthens or weakens either the reliability of the tipster or 
the content of the tipster's information"). But it's important to note that Loken did not see 
any balloons before he detained Matthew. See R.284:31; 285:5, 10. Instead, he saw only 
that Matthew was fiddling with something-Loken couldn't see what-over a towel on 
his lap. R.284:31; 285:5, 10. Thus, Loken could not determine for himself whether there 
were any balloons at all. 
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Raines's tip did not provide Loken with reasonable suspicion, so the question 
becomes whether Loken personally observed anything that, combined with Raines's tip, 
gave him reasonable suspicion. See Lloyd, 2011 UT App 323, ,II 7. He did not. Up until 
the point when the driver noticed him, everything Loken observed as he approached the 
car was consistent with Raines's tip. He saw Matthew fiddling with something over a 
towel in his lap. R.284:31; 285:5. But, again, Loken couldn't see what Matthew was 
fiddling with, so he was unable to confirm whether or not there were balloons. R.284:31; 
285:5. As Loken leaned in for a closer look, he "caught the eye of the driver[,] who 
looked up" at him and "seemed startled." R.284:31; 285:5. This caused Matthew to tum 
to look at Loken. R.284:31; 285:5. As Matthew did so, he "got a real deer in the 
headlights look, big eyes, froze for a second." R.284:31. It was at that point that Loken 
effected the investigatory detention by saying, '"Police officer. Don't move."' R.284:31. 
Hence, the only fact Loken observed that added to Raines's tip was that the driver 
and Matthew gave Loken, who resembled a police officer, startled looks when they 
noticed him sneaking up behind them. R.284:30-31; 285:5. This fact cannot contribute at 
all to reasonable suspicion. On numerous occasions, the Utah Supreme Court and this 
Court have held that turning to look at an officer and acting nervously or excitedly does 
not contribute to reasonable suspicion even when the person is expecting the officer to 
approach. State v. Gurule, 2013 UT 58, ,r37, 321 P.3d 1039; State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 
1132, 1138 (Utah 1989); State v. Duhaime, 2011 UT App 209, ,r18, 258 P.3d 649; State 
v. Lowe, 2010 UT App 156, ,rl3, 234 P.3d 160; State v. Parke, 2009 UT App 50, ,r 11, 
205 P.3d 104; State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App 101, ifl5 n.8, 68 P.3d 1043. A startled look 
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is even less suspicious when the person is surprised by an officer sneaking up from 
behind. Indeed, the natural reaction to anyone sneaking up from behind-let alone a 
stranger who appears to be a police officer-is a staiiled look. Because Raines' s tip did 
not supply Loken with reasonable suspicion and Loken's observations contributed 
nothing to reasonable suspicion, Loken did not have reasonable suspicion to temporarily 
detain Matthew. 
On the facts of this case, whether Loken had reasonable suspicion may turn on 
whether Raines's report of seeing balloons provided him with reasonable suspicion. No 
other information known to Loken or Raines could plausibly give rise to reasonable 
suspicion. But Raines's report of seeing balloons did not give Loken reasonable suspicion 
because there was no evidence that Loken had any knowledge of a link between balloons 
and drugs. 2 See DeLao, 550 S. W.2d at 291. "Had the State produced any evidence on this 
issue," it might have been able to prove reasonable suspicion. Id. But it didn't. Therefore, 
the State failed to carry its burden to prove that Loken had reasonable suspicion to 
temporari 1 y detain Matthew. See id. 
C. Loken lacked probable cause when he arrested Matthew by trying to physically 
restrain Matthew's hands and telling Matthew that he was under arrest. 
"[T]he mere grasping or application of physical force with lawful authority, 
whether or not it succeeded in subduing the arrestee, [is] sufficient" to constitute an 
arrest, which is "the quintessential 'seizure of the person"' under the Fourth Amendment. 
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,624 (1991). A police officer is not justified in 
2 There was also no evidence that Raines or Worthington knew of a connection between 
balloons and drugs. 
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effecting an arrest unless the officer has probable cause to believe that the arrestee is 
engaged in criminal activity. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, ,II0. 
"[P]robable cause to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within the 
officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable 
caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is 
committing, or is about to commit an offense." State v. Hansen, 2011 UT App 242, ,IIO, 
262 P.3d 448 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Probable cause is more than suspicion 
but less than certainty." State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 226 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see 
also Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ,Il 1 (reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable 
cause). It requires a rational conclusion that there is a fair probability the arrestee is 
engaged in criminal activity. State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1996); 
Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 226-27. "[W]hether probable cause exists depends upon the 
reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the 
time of the arrest." Hansen, 2011 UT App 242, ,II 0 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The State bears the burden of proving that an arresting officer acted with probable cause. 
See Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ,I,I39-40. 
As with reasonable suspicion, probable cause may be based on an informant's tip. 
See State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, ,II I, 37 P.3d 260. Ultimately, the Court must 
look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the informant's tip, 
together with police observations, generated probable cause to arrest. Id. 
Loken arrested Matthew when he attempted to restrain Matthew's hands and told 
him he was under arrest. As already explained, Raines's tip and the startled looks from 
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the driver and Matthew did not even give Loken reasonable suspicion, let alone probable 
cause, by the time Loken told Matthew not to move. The question, then, is whether 
Loken observed anything after he told Matthew not to move that, combined with Raines's 
tip and the startled looks, gave him probable cause to arrest Matthew. He didn't. 
Between telling Matthew not to move and arresting him, Loken' s only observation 
was that Matthew pushed the towel that was on his lap down towards the floor of the car. 
R.284: 16, 20, 32; 285:6. Utah appellate courts have repeatedly held that such movements 
do not create probable cause or even reasonable suspicion. See Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 
1138; Parke, 2009 UT App 50, ififl0-11; State v. Martinez, 2008 UT App 90, if2 n.3, 182 
P.3d 385; State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 511-12 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In Schlosser, the Utah Supreme Court held that, during a valid traffic stop of a car 
in which the defendant was a passenger, the defendant's "movements, turning to the left 
and to the right, appearing fidgety, bending forward, and turning to look at the officer, do 
not, without more, show a reasonable possibility that criminal conduct had occurred or 
was about to occur." Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1138 (emphasis added). 
In Parke, an officer initiated a valid traffic stop of a car in which the defendant 
was the only occupant. Parke, 2009 UT App 50, ,r2. As the officer exited his vehicle, he 
observed the defendant make a shoulder movement, which the officer interpreted as the 
defendant reaching towards his waistband. Id. The officer testified that, in his experience, 
such movements often indicate concealment of contraband or weapons. Id. When the 
officer ordered the defendant to put his hands out of the window, the defendant became 
somewhat agitated, but he nevertheless complied. Id. A backup officer atTived. Id. Both 
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officers ordered the defendant out of the car for a protective frisk, as a result of which 
they found a knife on the defendant and drugs in the car. Id. ,r,r2-3. On appeal, this Court 
held that the protective frisk was unjustified, as the officers did not have reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant was armed and dangerous. Id. ,r18. Regarding the 
defendant's shoulder movement, the Court concluded that the officer's belief that the 
defendant may have been concealing contraband or a weapon "was a 'hunch' or an 
'inchoate suspicion,' not a 'particular fact' or 'particular inference' that justified the 
protective frisk." Id. ,r10. The Court stated, "[W]hile an officer's interpretation of a 
suspect's movements is a subjective factor we consider, when it is impossible to draw a 
clear inference regarding the nature of the movement, any interpretation of criminality or 
danger in such a movement by a police officer is just a 'hunch' or 'inchoate suspicion.'" 
Id. ,rI 1. 
In Martinez, the officer who performed the challenged traffic stop testified that, 
"at the time he was pulling over the car, [the defendant] and the other backseat passenger 
were 'moving their arms around and bending forward . .. like they were putting 
something down at their feet on the floorboard."' Martinez, 2008 UT App 90, ,r2 n.3 
( emphasis added). The Court held that "[ s ]uch conduct alone ... does not establish 
reasonable, articulable suspicion." Id. 
In Holmes, an officer performing a valid traffic stop witnessed the passenger move 
her purse from her lap to the floor, remove a roll of paper towels from it, and then try to 
stuff the roll of paper towels down between the car seat and the center console. Holmes, 
25 
77 4 P .2d at 510-12. The Court held that the officer did not have probable cause to seize 
the roll of paper towels. Id. at 511-12. 
Just as in Schlosser, Parke, Martinez, and Holmes, Matthew pushing the towel to 
the floor did not give Loken probable cause. Loken's belief that Matthew was hiding 
contraband or reaching for a weapon was a mere hunch or inchoate suspicion, not a 
particular fact or patticular inference that created probable cause to arrest. Cf Parke, 
2009 UT App 50, if 10. Thus, Loken's arrest of Matthew violated the Fourth Amendment. 
In the trial court, the prosecutor argued that Loken had probable cause to a1Test 
Matthew for interfering with a lawful detention because Matthew moved after Loken 
ordered him not to. R.151-52; 283:9-10. The trial court did not address this argument in 
its ruling. But the argument fails because there was no evidence that Loken knew or 
reasonably believed that Matthew committed a crime by moving after Loken told him not 
to. A justified arrest requires probable cause to believe that the arrestee was or is engaged 
in criminal activity. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, iJl 0. Hence, at the time of the arrest, the 
arresting officer must possess a reasonable belief that the arrestee's conduct constitutes a 
crime. See Heien v. N Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014) (determining whether an 
officer was justified in conducting an investigatory detention involves "the antecedent 
question of whether it was reasonable for [the] officer to suspect that the defendant's 
conduct was illegal"); United States v. Hughes, 606 F.3d 311, 316-17 (6th Cir. 2010) ("In 
order for a stop based on a moving or parking violation to be permissible under the 
Fourth Amendment, it is not sufficient for a police officer to know the facts that give rise 
to probable cause or reasonable suspicion; the officer must also, at the time of the stop, 
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know or reasonably believe that those facts actually give rise to probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion. In other words, in order for traffic stop to be pennissible under the 
Fourth Amendment, a police officer must know or reasonably believe that the driver of 
the car is doing something that represents a violation of law."). The burden is on the State 
to show that the officer possessed such a reasonable belief. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ifif39-
40. In this case, Loken never testified that he believed Matthew committed a crime by 
moving after Loken had ordered him not to. Loken testified only that he believed 
Matthew was hiding contraband or retrieving a weapon. R.284:32; 285:6. And, as 
explained above, Loken did not have probable cause to believe Matthew was hiding 
contraband or rettieving a weapon. Thus, the State failed to prove that Matthew pushing 
the towel towards the floor gave Loken probable cause to arrest. 
The prosecutor also argued that "exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless 
search" were created when Matthew pushed the towel to the floor. R.146-47; 149-51. 
(The trial court's ruling did not address this argument, either.) The prosecutor seemed to 
believe that "exigent circumstances" can justify a warrantless search even in the absence 
of probable cause. R.146-4 7; 149-51. But this isn't true. Exigent circumstances cannot 
justify a warrantless search unless there is also probable cause. Anderson, 910 P.2d at 
1236 ( explaining that "probable cause and exigent circumstances" are both required for 
"a valid warrantless search of an automobile"). And, for the reasons given above, Loken 
did not have probable cause to arrest Matthew or search him or the car. 
In sum, Raines's tip, the startled looks from the driver and Matthew, and Matthew 
pushing the towel to the floor did not give Loken probable cause to arrest Matthew or 
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search him or the car. Therefore~ the trial court erred in denying Matthew's motion to 
suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Matthew asks the Court to reverse and remand for 
further proceedings. 
~ 
SUBMITTED this l ~ day of June, 2015. 
ttomey for Defendant/ Appellant 
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTES STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
vs. Case No: 131401457 FS 
Judge: CHARLENE BARLOW MATTHEW JAMES HINMON, 
Defendant. Date: November 25, 2014 
PRESENT 
Clerk: loriaw 
Prosecutor: CARLSON, WILLIAM J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CHESNUT, HEATHER J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 28, 1983 
Sheriff Office#: 292319 
Audio 
Tape Number: 37 Tape Count: 10.12-19 
CHARGES 
1. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/02/2014 Guilty 
2. INTERFERENCE WITH ARRESTING OFFICER - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/02/2014 Guil_ty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A 
CONTRO~LED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of INTERFERENCE WITH ARRESTING 
OFFICER a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 180 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 178 
day{s). 
Credit is granted for 2 day(s) previously served. 
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0000224 
Case No: 131401457 Date: Nov 25, 2014 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge# 1 Fine: $5000.00 
Suspended: $4700.00 
Surcharge: $159.47 
Due: $300.00 
Charge# 2 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended: $700.00 
Surcharge: $159.47 
Due: $300.00 
Total Fine: $6000.00 
Total Suspended: $5400.00 
Total Surcharge: $318.94 
Total Principal Due: $600.00 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE COMMUNITY SERVICE NOTE 
Complete so_ hours of community service. Rate to be determined by 
ap&p. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole. 
The imposition of sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on 
probation. 
Defendant tp serve 2 day{s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 600.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
No other violations. 
Report to AP&P within 24 hours 
Notify the ~ourt of any address change. 
Timely payments on all fines, attorney fees and restitution. 
Not to possess or consume alcohol or non prescribed contol 
substances. 
Not to associate with persons or frequent places where drugs or 
alcohol are sold. 
Continue treatment and ua•s with tranguility place. 
Taper of methadone. 
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U. S. Constitution Amendment IV 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U. S. Constitution Amendment XIV 
Amendment 14 - Citizenship Rights. Ratified 7/9/1868. 
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding 
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the 
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and 
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, 
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and 
Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any 
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of 
the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged 
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall 
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against 
the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such 
debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article. 
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WEST JORDAN, UTAH; JUNE 24, 2014 
JUDGE CHARLENE BARLOW 
(Transcriber's note: Identification of speakers 
may not be accurate with the audio recordings.) 
PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: Okay, now we are here on the Matthew 
Hinmon matter. Ms. Chesnut is here with Mr. Hinmon and Mr. 
Carlson is here. We have a motion to suppress. I've read 
the motion and the memorandum. I've read the responsive 
memorandum. We're here for oral argument. 
Okay, Ms. Chesnut. 
MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, I'd just like to make 
sure the Court has all of the pleadings that have been 
entered. We have a defense motion and memorandum and then a 
State response and then a defense reply to the response. 
THE COURT: Let me see. I didn't -
MS. CHESNUT: The reply was only filed yesterday. 
THE COURT: Okay. So let me pull it up here if my 
computer will wake up. Something else is opened, it's 
loading. Okay, there is the reply. Let me have a moment, I 
will read through it. 
Why don't you go ahead and argue? 
MS. CHESNUT: Thank you, Your Honor. Oh, I should 
add, besides those pleadings, also what should have been 
attached, either that or entered into evidence at the 
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evidentiary hearing is the witness statements of Raymond 
Loken, Craig Worthington and Mark Raines and then also the 
evidentiary hearing transcript and the preliminary hearing 
transcript. 
THE COURT: Okay, I have the two transcripts. Did 
the State withdraw the statements? 
MS. CHESNUT: I think the defense submitted those. 
MR. CARLSON: I believe so, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I do not see them. Let me see the 
minutes for the preliminary hearing. Exhibits 1 and 2 w~re 
admitted for the purpose of this preliminary hearing. They 
were returned to the State. 
MS. CHESNUT: Okay, I think also at the evidentiary 
hearing they were submitted. 
THE COURT: Okay, let me make sure that I have them 
because I don't see them in here. Okay. There's the 
evidentiary hearing transcript. Let me see if they're - I 
don't see that they are in the docket anywhere. So I 
probably -
MR. CARLSON: I do have State's Exhibit 1 and 2 
from the preliminary hearing which were returned. That's 
Craig Worthington and Mark Raines. 
THE COURT: So if you'll return them to me and then 
I'll use them as we're dealing with this. 
MS. CHESNUT: Okay. 
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(Inaudible conversation) 
THE COURT: Okay. Did you want to also submit 
Officer Loken's statement? 
MS. CHESNUT: I do, Your Honor. As I recall I 
asked that that be submitted into evidence at the evidentiary 
hearing. So if I may approach? 
THE COURT: Okay. Yeah, if you'll approach with 
that. All right, okay, thank you. Okay, I think I have 
everything in front of me now. 
MS. CHESNUT: Okay. And Your Honor, generally 
we've submitted already in writing the arguments that we have 
of the defense on this motion. I would just add to that that 
essentially what we're arguing is that this stop was 
problematic from the very beginning. The immediate action 
that Officer Loken took was to issue invasive commands, 
ustop. This is the police. Don't move. Don't do anything 
stupid. Put your hands up." These are classic indicia of 
arrest, of at least taking control of a person and indicating 
that there's authority for that person to be taken control 
of, they must do what the officer says and that they cannot 
do anything he does not say. 
Now, there's been, of course, arguments in the 
pleadings. We're of course arguing this as an arrest. The 
state has argued this is a level 2 stop, an investigatory 
detention. But, the truth is here that whichever one this 
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is, there was no justification either way and as I've said, 
we maintain that this was an arrest because of the 
invasiveness of the commands. I don't know how any 
reasonable citizen would interpret this any other way other 
than he is being arrested. 
But, regardless of which it is, there was not 
either probable cause or even reasonable suspicion to support 
this kind of an action by the police. Officer Loken did not 
see a crime. He came up behind the car. He was looking but 
he didn't see anything that would constitute a crime. 
Now before that he had talked to, of course, one of 
the employees of the store and he was questioned closely, 
pardon me, at both the preliminary hearing and the 
evidentiary hearing about what he knew as he approached this 
car and Officer Loken said both times that, well, he was told 
there's a suspicious person out there, there's potentially 
some kind of drug activity going on. And that's basically 
what he remembered. He was specifically asked, well, were 
you told about balloons? And he said - hopefully I'm quoting 
this as accurately as possible - Well, I don't recall 
anything like that. 
So as we've argued in the reply, what is crucial 
here is what Officer Loken knew as the officer that took 
charge and conducted this activity with Mr. Hinman. And 
that's what he said is he said he had information there was a 
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suspicious person, possibly drug activity. Well, this 
certainly isn't probably cause and it's not even reasonable 
suspicion without more. 
Now, there is some testimony from the employee that 
he said he went past the car, he saw a bunch of balloons, he 
saw maybe over 20 balloons he says. Well, as I've already 
said, regardless of what he says he saw, it's what Officer 
Loken knew or believed that's at issue here and not the 
employee. 
Also, I would ask that the employee's factual 
representations don't appear to be reliable. He's saying, Oh 
I saw over 20 balloons. When the situation was completely 
concluded, only one was found and there's no indication from 
anyone that any balloons were disposed of in any way. So it 
doesn't appear to be sound. 
Now, the State has argued that regardless there 
were exigent circumstances here but in this case there's no 
indication that any evidence was about to be disposed of or 
destroyed. The State has cited a test which basically is a 
test having to do with searches and whether they are 
appropriate under the exigent circumstances exception. I 
don't, as I've argued, I don't think this applies because as 
we said, this was an arrest, this was an immediate command 
similar to what would happen if the police observed a felony 
or was conducting a felony stop. But in this case there 
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wasn't anything like that. But even if that test is applied, 
it requires that there be a clear indication that there's 
evidence and that there's eminent destruction of that 
evidence. Well, in this case, Mr. Hinman was a passenger in 
a car and he had Officer Loken on one side and the driver on 
the other side and all of the testimony is is that he took 
his hands and shoved them towards the floor. Well, this 
wouldn't result in a destruction of evidence. At most it 
could be said to be a rather feeble attempt, really to hide 
evidence. But that's not what meets the standard. 
Now, also, there has to be a clear indication of 
evidence and even though Officer Loken had heard from an 
employee, well, I think there's a suspicious guy out there, 
maybe doing drug activity, that's not enough to indicate 
15 there is evidence here. 
16 
17 
The State has also brought up the potential of a 
safety issue here. Now, we addressed that in our original 
18 1 memorandum basically in terms of a Terry Frisk body of law, 
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not that that necessarily applies but it demonstrates there 
has to be an objective standard for thinking there's some 
kind of a risk. 
Now, Officer Loken testified he didn't have any 
information there was a weapon, he didn't have any 
indications there was a weapon. It wasn't a high crime area, 
it wasn't a dark time of the day, he had no objective 
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indications there was a weapon here and so, you know, Your 
Honor, the safety issue just really isn't in play here and at 
any rate, even if it was, the Fourth Amendment Violation 
started prior to that. 
As I understand it, the State's arguing that well, 
when he pushed this towel between his knees, this was a 
potential safety issue. But, the police began their seizure 
of Mr. Hinman, their illegal seizure of Mr. Hinrnon prior to 
that when they issued these invasive commands, required that 
he conform to what they were commanding. 
That's basically our argument in a nutshell unless 
the Court has further questions. 
THE COURT: No, that's fine, thank you. 
Mr. Carlson? 
MR. CARLSON: The State's position is that Mr. 
Rai~es' testimony is very relevant because as the citizen 
informant, what he observed and what he reported to Officer 
Loken goes to whether or not he had a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion to detain the defendant at the time in question. 
Now Mr. Raines did testify that he saw the balloons and that 
he described the balloons. The fact that at the evidentiary 
hearing the officer said, well, today I don't recall, does 
not mean that the officer did not have that information at 
the time. Mr. Raines is a highly reliable informant. He 
described and directed the officer specifically to the 
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defendant's vehicle and what Officer Loken observed matched 
everything that Mr. Raines had reported up until that point. 
Beyond that, the State's argument is that first 
there was articulable suspicion for the detention and that's 
all it was at that point. When Officer Loken said, Stop, 
don't move, he was doing the equivalent of when a police 
officer turns on emergency lights and a siren. He was giving 
an order to a person suspected of committing a crime. That 
is not an arrest, it is a detention and it's not consensual. 
The State does agree that it was not a consensual stop, it 
wasn't level 1, it was a level 2. But under the law the 
officer could perform a detention long enough to confirm or 
dispel his suspicions. 
When the defendant responded by shoving his arms to 
the ground, there are two different arguments that the state 
has that would say Officer Loken was justified in reaching 
after him. The first is just as Officer Loken had reasonable 
articulable suspicion to detain the defendant, he was able to 
maintain that detention and by reaching in just to grab his 
arms, all he was trying to do was to maintain control during 
that detention long enough to confirm or dispel. The 
defendant's actions created exigent circumstances that 
justified that. 
And the State really does believe that State v. 
Alvarez is dispositive in th~s case because in State v. 
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Alvarez, officers relied on two separate anonymous reports 
and based on that confronted the defendant in that case and 
even though they had no reason to believe there was anything 
in the defendant's mouth up until the point they asked to 
check his mouth, when they said they wanted to check his 
mouth, they saw him swallow and that swallowing motion was 
enough, according to the court, to bend the defendant over 
and force him to spit and then resulting in several heroin 
cocaine balloons coming out in that case. If the officer 
without apy suspicion in Alvarez is able to bend a defendant 
over during an investigative detention to confirm or dispel 
his suspicions, certainly Officer Loken was justified in 
reaching for the defendant's arms after he shoved them down 
towards the floor. 
Separate from that, the State's argument is that 
once he was under detention, and once Officer Loken gave him 
an order to not move, the defendant's action of shoving his 
hands forward after being ordered not to move, immediately 
gave Officer Loken probable cause to arrest the defendant for 
resisting a detention which is a whole separate violation of 
the state code. So under either philosophy the State would 
argue that this balloon that popped up as a result of the 
struggle should not be suppressed. 
As far as the reliability of Mr. Raines' testimony 
because 20 balloons were not found, it's very clear during 
,__ __________________ ..•.. ·--···· .......... ___ ... --··--
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the exchange that happened during the struggle, the defendant 
was trying to swallow the heroin balloons and again, the 
State would refer to Alvarez where officers found more than 
10 balloons in the defendant's mouth. So the fact that, that 
where weren't several balloons found after we know the 
defendant was trying to hide the balloons, doesn't say that 
Mr. Raines' testimony was not reliable. In fact, it confirms 
and accordingly we would ask that you deny the defendant's 
motion. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Your response Ms. Chesnut? 
MS. CHESNUT: Yes, just briefly. 
First of all, the State's arguing this was an 
investigatory stop. I'll point out typically the way this 
kind of an investigatory stop takes place is police operate 
lights and sirens, they require a person to stop their car, 
they can ask a person to show a license or a registration, 
they can ask them to step out of the car. They can even ask 
them to put their hands perhaps on the dash. But what we're 
talking about here is a lot more invasive. It was, Police. 
Stop, don't move, put your hands up. These were much more 
particularized commands than what is going to be taking place 
during an investigatory detention. That is why we argue that 
this is an arrest. That is what an arrest is, is to be taken 
into custody, taken complete control of by the police and 
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that is what was happening here. 
Now, as far as Alvarez goes - and we've argued this 
in our reply, but in that case the police had much more 
information than Officer Loken had about Mr. Hinmon here. In 
Alvarez the police had been watching what they had been 
informed was a potential drug house. They were conducting 
surveillance. They saw the defendant come to the area, go 
inside the condominium corr~lex, stay a short time, come out. 
In their training and experience they knew that drug dealers 
will often return to the same place at the same time the next 
day. So they waited for him the next day and indeed he did 
come at the some time, same place the next day. When he went 
into the condominium complex officers simply walked past his 
car, they peered into the window and they see a 
representation of the patrons saint of drug dealers which I 
didn't know there was such a thing but it says so in this 
case. They see this representation and they also see a small 
bottle of water that they say from their training and 
experience is commonly kept on hand in order to swallow 
balloons. 
Now, then they see the defendant coming towards his 
car, they approach him. They actually see swallowing motions 
as well as he's working his jaws. That's much more than what 
we have in this case. In this case all we have is suspicious 
person, potential drug activity and when Officer Loken made 
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this stop based only this evidence, he had looked in the car 
but he didn't see anything, not anything illegal, iIIL~ediately 
then he seized the defendant by issuing these commands. 
That's much more than - Alvarez had much more than what we 
have in this case. 
And just briefly, with regard to the reliability of 
the grocery employee's representation he saw some 20 or more 
balloons, the reason that we say it's not reliable is that in 
this case he said he saw 20 or more balloons, he went into 
the store. No one approached the defendant until Officer 
Loken came and tried to peer over his shoulder and started 
issuing these commands. If there had been some 20 balloons, 
the most logical thing to happen is that they would still be 
there because there was no reason for these balloons to be 
swallowed or otherwise disposed of if no one was stopping 
these individuals in the car. And the only time that kind of 
situation arose is when Officer Loken came, issued his 
commands and from that point on, they had continual 
interaction with the defendant and as I said, there were not 
20 balloons found, but only one and so it casts serious doubt 
on the reliability of that testimony. 
But at any rate, that is not what officer Loken 
understood from the employee as he testified both at the 
evidentiary hearing and the preliminary hearing. And we'd 
submit with that. 
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THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Ms. Chesnut. 
Well, since I didn't get a chance to review the 
reply memorandum before the hearing and based upon the fact 
that I think this is a, not an easy decision, I am going to 
take the matter under advisement. Are we set for any further 
hearing at this point? We are not. Let's go ahead and set 
if for a scheduling conference in two weeks. Do you want 
Monday, Tuesday or Thursday? 
MS. CHESNUT: Thursday if we could. 
THE COURT: Okay, let's set if for another 
scheduling conference or pretrial. We've had the prelim in 
this so it would be a pretrial, excuse me. So a pretrial 
conference on July 10 th at 8:30 in the morning. In the 
meantime, let's see, Mr. Hinman is out on bond; is that 
correct? 
DEFENDANT HINMON: Yes. 
THE COURT: I am a little concerned. I would like 
to do a drug test. So Mr. Hinman if you'll step in with 
Officer Green, we'll have you do a draw test. 
DEFENDANT HINMON: Your Honor, I do take methadone, 
I have my prescription with me. 
THE COURT: Okay, well let's -
DEFENDANT HINMON: I've been under treatment with 
methadone. 
THE COURT: - let's have you do a drug test and see 
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what shows up if anything. Well, the methadone should show 
up. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken) 
THE COURT: You have a prescription for methadone 
which would show heroin, we understand that or - but you did 
test positive for cocaine. 
DEFENDANT HINMON: There is no way possible. Can 
you please do another test with the same urine? I vow that 
that's not anything - I've been in treatment on my own since 
November. I've not had one dirty UA. I get UA'd there very 
often at Tranquility Place. I pay it myself and I've never 
had one dirty drug test and I definitely would not use and 
come to court and you can call my counselor there, I've never 
had a dirty - that's preposterous. That never even was a 
drug that I chose to take. 
(Inaudible conversation) 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. I'm sorry, there was a 
miscommunication here and we just gave Mr. Hinmon a heart 
attack. So ... okay, then you can remain out on bond. So we 
will plan on seeing everybody back here on the 10th • 
Okay, thank you very much. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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WEST JORDAN, UTAH; APRIL 3, 2014 
JUDGE CHARLENE BARLOW 
(Transcriber's note: Identification of speakers 
may not be accurate with the audio recordings.) 
PROCEEDINGS 
MS. CHESNUT: And I also have Matthew Hinman. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. CHESNUT: And that's an evidentiary hearing, 
Your Honor. 
MR. CARLSON: I don't know where Mr. Torrance went. 
I think Ms. (inaudible) and the interpreter had a chance to 
interact. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken) 
THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 
MR. CARLSON: The State has three witnesses -
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CARLSON: - that will be testifying today. The 
first witness we call is Mark Raines. 
THE COURT: What was that last name again? 
MR. CARLSON: Raines, R-A-I-N-E-S. 
THE COURT: Thank you. If you will step right up 
here and be sworn in please first. 
WALTER MARK RAINES 
having been first duly sworn, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 
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THE COURT: Okay, if you will have a seat up here 
in the witness chair and pull it up until you're comfortable 
and then if you'll pull the microphone - well, yeah, you 
don't have to be very close to it but we record as well as 
amplify. 
So go ahead, Mr. Carlson. 
MR. CARLSON: And for the Court's information all 
the witnesses are present in the courtroom. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CARLSON: 
Q Mr. Raines, will you please state and spell your 
name for the record? 
A Sure. My full name is Walter Mark Raines, 
R-A-I-N-E-S. 
Q And what is your occupation? 
MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, we would ask the Court to 
invoke the exclusionary rule. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CARLSON: I thought that might be coming. 
THE COURT: He gave you a heads up so it took you a 
minute. So okay, the other people that are here to testify, 
if you'll step outside. 
MR. CARLSON: Your Honor, Officer Loken is the case 
manager. 
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THE COURT: Okay. Officer, if you'll step up here 
and then we'll proceed. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Go ahead. 
{BY MR. CARLSON) Sorry about that. 
No problem. 
So Mr. Raines, where do you work? 
I work at Harmon's Grocery Store, it's located on 
700 East and 11400 South. 
Q 
A 
Is that in Salt Lake County? 
I believe so, yes. 
THE COURT: I'll take judicial notice it is. If 
it's inside point of the mountain, it's Salt lake. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: And if it's inside of those mountains 
it's Salt Lake. 
Q (BY MR. CARLSON) How long have you worked there? 
A Coming up on eight years this summer. 
Q And were you working there on September 19 th Of 
last year? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q And while you were at Harmon's that day did 
anything unusual happen in the parking lot? 
A Yes, there did. I was coming, leaving to my 
vehicle and -
Q Leaving to go to work or leaving work? 
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A No, I was walking out of the building to go to my 
car. I wasn't leaving work just yet, I just happened to be 
going to my car on break. 
Okay, well, what happened next? Q 
A I (inaudible) green vehicle. I'm guessing it was a 
Geo Metro, I'm not sure, but it caught my eye because the 
door frame almost seemed like it had been welded upon the 
car. So it caught my attention. I looked in and I saw a 
young man on the passenger side and he became very suspicious 
as soon as I looked over, kind of -
Q What do you mean by suspicious? 
A He lurched forward and almost kind of covered up 
what was going on and, you know, I walk around to the other 
side, they had pulled in backwards and I was pulled forward 
so I'm looking at their driver side at this point and I look 
inside the vehicle and saw a towel over the gentleman's lap 
with a bunch of pink balloons sitting on top of that and what 
appeared to me to be a transaction between the driver and the 
passenger. 
Q What kind of experience, if any, do you have with 
drugs? 
A With drugs themselves, I have been cited before 
many years ago for marijuana paraphernalia. Other than that, 
other than that just watching TV, court TV, anything like 
that. 
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Q And based on your, your background, what did you 
think was going on in the car? 
A I looked at it and had to think that this was a 
drug transac~ion, that the gentleman was selling narcotics to 
the driver. 
So what did you do at that point? Q 
A Right then I radioed into my grocery manager, Craig 
Worthington and told him that I would need him and our 
security guard to come out and handle this, to take a look at 
it. 
Q Did you see, just for clarification, do you see 
anyone in the courtroom today that was in that Geo that day? 
A 
Q 
Yes, I do, sir. 
Will you describe where that person is and what 
that person is wearing? 
A This person is sitting at the defense table wearing 
a black shirt with a blue tie. 
THE COURT: The record will reflect he's indicated 
the defendant. 
MR. CARLSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Q (BY MR. CARLSON) So what specifically did you say 
over the radio? 
A I said, ucraig, you need to come out here, there's 
a transaction going on right in our parking lot on the 
employee side," which is, that's just kind of where most 
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employees park, on that one end. 
Q Did you describe what type of transaction? 
A No, I did not over the radio. No, I did not. 
Q Okay. So what happened next? 
A So I moved my vehicle away because as I explained I 
was parked right next to them. I moved my vehicle maybe 
about 30 feet and as they were coming out of, our security 
guard and Craig were coming out, I said things like, Yeah, 
they're just over there and he's got - right on his lap he's 
got a bunch of pink balloons going right there. They then 
walked over and I stayed behind just a minute and I mean, 
maybe second afterwards I was radioed to come over and assist 
them. 
Q All right. Did you say anything else to them when 
you, when you saw them coming out of the store? 
A Ummm, just that I said the description of the car 
and that he was on the one side, that the person that seemed 
to be selling it was on the passenger side and other than 
that, just that I saw pink balloons. 
Q Did you know Officer Ray Loken at that time? 
A 
Q 
Yes, I did. I had known him for a couple of years. 
And does Harmon's have a policy of giving bonuses 
or incentives to people who report things? 
A Not at all, quite the opposite. It just took time 
out of my day. 
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Q 
A 
questions. 
Have you ever been a criminal informant before? 
No, I have not. 
MR. CARLSON: Thank you .. I have no further 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Cross examination? 
MS. CHESNUT: Thank you, Your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MS. CHESNUT: 
Q 
A 
Q 
Now, you work in what department at the Harmon 1 s? 
The produce section. 
Okay, do you manage the produce section or just 
work there? 
A I work there. I'm what's known as a journeyman. 
So I'm kind of, I help with managerial work but it 1 s not my 
official duties. 
Q Okay, and how long have you been working there? 
A Almost eight years. 
Q Okay. Now, you said that you saw a passenger lurch 
forward when you went past, correct? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q 
A 
Now before he lurched forward what did you see? 
I saw just kind of them talking and I believe they 
were smoking cigarettes at the time. So when I had first 
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come upon I just saw him lurch forward and kind of look over 
to me in a manner that struck me as suspicious. 
Q 
A 
How close did you get to the car? 
Within - I was at their tail end so within four 
feet, whatever it is from bumper to door. 
Q So you were behind the car? 
A Like I said, they had pulled in backwards, so yes, 
I was walking behind there. 
Q And after he lurched forward did you stay around 
and watch more or did you go into the store? 
A No, no, what I said was I had come upon to my 
driver's side of my vehicle and that's when I had looked 
through the window of their driver's window and looked and 
actually saw the balloons across his lap. 
Q Okay, you actually saw pink balloons at that time? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes, I did. 
How many did you see? 
An estimate I would have to say would be over 20. 
Over 20? 
Again an estimate. 
They were all on his lap? 
Yes. 
Did the driver have any of these balloons? 
A She was kind of looking at them but, no, she did 
not have any in her possession. 
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Q Did you see balloons anywhere other than on the 
passenger's lap? 
A No. No, I did not. 
Q Now, you remember writing a witness statement for 
the police about this incident, correct? 
A Of course, yes. 
Q Now, do you recall whether you told them that you 
saw pink balloons at the time you first noticed the car? 
Yes, yes, I believe I did. A 
Q Okay, if I could show you your statement would that 
help? 
A 
Q 
Absolutely. 
MS. CHESNUT: May I approach, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
(BY MS. CHESNUT) Does this look like a copy of 
your witness statement? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes, it does. 
And would you please review that? 
Sure. Okay. 
So, now (inaudible) in your witness statement you 
didn't write that you saw pink balloons before going into the 
store, did you? 
A No I did not on this statement. 
Q In fact you specifically said that you saw 
something that the passenger had in his hands, correct? 
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A It is saying that he rearranged something as in to 
me he was kind of trying to hide it right at first but then I 
did see the balloons. 
Q Okay, but you didn't put that in your statement 
that you wrote? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Okay, now, so 20 pink balloons, so you view that as 
kind of a lot of balloons? 
A Yes, I don't have much experience in that or 
anything but I thought that was - to me it was obvious that 
it was someone selling. It wasn't just something that he had 
for just personal use. 
Q Okay. Now, if you view this as a lot of balloons 
why would you have not put this in your police statement? 
A The only thing is at that point I had already been 
about an hour and half out of work and dealing with this 
situation and I seemed to be a little too brief. 
Q Okay. That seems like a pretty significant 
omission, doesn't it, that you didn't put in your witness 
statement, you saw 20 pink balloons? 
A Would you restate the question? I'm not sure what 
you're saying. 
Q 
A 
Doesn't that seem like a significant omission? 
It definitely seems like something I should have 
mentioned that I saw the balloons themselves but I did see 
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something that brought it in. 
Q Okay. Now, did you ever, did you ever see any pink 
balloons later in this incident? 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes, I did. 
And when was that? 
That's after I was called back to assist. I 
witnessed him trying to swallow the balloons. So he was 
really grabbing balloons that kind of got scattered and were 
trying to swallow them. 
Q 
A 
Q 
Okay. And who was there at the time? 
Officer Ray and my grocery manager, Craig. 
Okay. Now what were Craig and Ray doing at the 
time you saw him try and swallow these balloons? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Trying to stop him from swallowing the balloons. 
And you specifically saw these balloons? 
Yes, I did. 
Did he appear to have all 20 in his hands? 
A No, no, I wouldn't say - like I said I had left for 
just that second so by the time I showed back up I had just 
seen the couple that he had started to swallow and I know 
that my grocery manager had actually confiscated a few at 
that time 'cause I did see some in the backseat that were 
scattered. Other than that though, I didn't see anything 
past that. 
Q Okay. You saw some in the backseat after you came 
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back out of the store? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q So after that initial viewing of the car? 
Uh-huh (affirmative). A 
Q 
A 
Did you ever go inside of the vehicle at any point? 
Inside the vehicle? Ummm, I leaned in a little bit 
to kind of help stop him from swallowing balloons. 
Q Okay, did you ever take anything out of the 
vehicle? 
A Did I take - no, no, I did not. 
Q Did you ever receive something from someone else 
who had taken anything out of the vehicle? 
A No. 
MS. CHESNUT: Okay. If I could have just a minute, 
Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MS. CHESNUT: And Your Honor, we would move to have 
admitted into evidence Mr. Raines' witness statement as 
Defense Exhibit A. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. CARLSON: No. 
THE COURT: Okay, we will mark it as Defense 
Exhibit A and it will be admitted. 
(Defendant's Exhibit No. A received) 
MS. CHESNUT: If I could approach? 
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THE COURT: You may. Thank you. 
MS. CHESNUT: That's all I have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, any redirect? 
MR. CARLSON: The State has no further questions 
and with leave from the Court would like to excuse this 
witness. 
THE COURT: May he be excused, Ms. Chesnut? 
MS. CHESNUT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may be excused, Mr. Raines. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Before we start the next one why don't 
we recall Mr. Torrence's case. 
(Whereupon another case was heard) 
THE COURT: Let's go back to the Hinmon case. 
MR. CARLSON: Next witness is Craig Worthington, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. If you'll step out and bring him 
in please. 
MR. CARLSON: If I may step out to retrieve him. 
THE COURT: Or Mr. LaPresto, one or the other, if 
you'll send him in? 
MR. CARLSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay sir, if you'll step right up here 
in front of my clerk and she will swear you in please. 
Ill 
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CRAIG WORTHINGTON 
having been first duly sworn, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 
THE COURT: Okay, if you'll have a seat up here in 
the witness chair and once you get comfortable we record as 
well as amplify. You don't need to get very close to the 
microphone but at least - yeah, that looks good. 
Okay, go ahead, Mr. Carlson. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CARLSON: 
Q Will you please state and spell your name for the 
recording? 
A It's Craig Stephen Worthington II, last name is 
spelled W-0-R-T-H-I-N-G-T-0-N. 
And what is your occupation, Mr. Worthington? Q 
A I'm the grocery manager over at Harmon's currently 
at the Draper store. 
Q 
A 
Q 
year? 
A 
Is that where you were working last year? 
Yes, it is. 
And were you on duty on September 19 th of last 
Yes, I was. 
Q While on duty that day did you receive a radio 
transmission from Mark Raines? 
A Yes, I did. 
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WEST JORDAN, UTAH; FEBRUARY 11, 2014 
JUDGE MARK KOURIS 
(Transcriber's note: Identification of speakers 
may not be accurate with the audio recordings.} 
PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: Good afternoon, Ms. Chesnut. We ready 
to proceed? 
correct? 
MS. CHESNUT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: This is Mr. Matthew Hinmon; is that 
MS. CHESNUT: That's right. 
THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Hinmon. 
DEFENDANT HINMON: Good afternoon. 
THE COURT: Counsel, you may begin. 
MR. CARLSON: Your Honor, the State has two 
witnesses. Do you want to swear them both in at once or one 
at a time? 
THE COURT: One at a time is fine. 
MR. CARLSON: All right, the State would call 
Officer Raymond Loken to the stand. 
MS. CHESNUT: And the defense would ask the Court 
to invoke the exclusionary rule. 
THE COURT: Very good. And I would ask both side to 
go ahead and police that. 
Officer, if you'll come right over here please and 
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raise your right hand. 
RAYMOND LOKEN 
having been first duly sworn, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 
THE COURT: Sir, if you'll be seated right at the 
witness stand. It looks like somebody pushed that chair out 
of the way over there. You can kind of center that chair if 
you'd like. Once you're comfortably seated, pull yourself up 
there and that microphone is flexible so bend it however it's 
comfortable for you. If you'll please state your name and 
spell your last name for the record. 
THE WITNESS: My name is Raymond Loken, L-0-K-E-N. 
THE COURT: Thank you, officer, 
Counsel? 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CARLSON: 
Q 
A 
Officer Loken, what's your main occupation? 
I'm a conservation officer with the Utah Division 
of Wildlife Resources. 
Q And what does a conservation officer do? 
A It's a full-time peace officer position where I 
mainly go out and enforce wildlife laws throughout the state. 
Q Do you have the power to make arrests as a 
conservation officer? 
A Yes, sir. 
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Q Do you have any other occupation? 
A I am, I have a part-time job as a security officer 
for Harmon's Grocery. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Is that the Harmon's at 11400 South 700 East? 
Yes, sir. 
Is that in Salt Lake County? 
Yes. 
Were you working at the Harmon's on September 19th 
of last year? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q And while working there that day were you call~d 
out to the parking lot? 
A Yes. One of the store employees came inside the 
store and contacted me and said he'd observed something in 
the parking lot that appeared to be suspicious that he 
thought possibly drug related. 
Q So what did you do? 
A Umrnm, I had with me at the time the grocery manager 
and the individual who had come in and I asked him what 
happened. 
Q What are the names of those people? 
A I only know their first names, not really that 
familiar with everybody. Craig is the grocery manager and 
Mark is one of the guys that works in produce. 
Q Okay. So sorry, didn't mean to interrupt. 
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A I had asked Mark who was the individual who came in 
the store what he had observed and he told me he was getting 
ready to leave, he had walked out to his vehicle and in the 
course of going out, passed by a car that was parked on the 
west side of the store. When he glanced in the car it was 
occupied by two people and he said they were doing something 
that to him appeared suspicious, so he kind of stared and 
then the male that was in the car looked at him and either 
gave him a look or said something to the effect of what are 
you looking at and Mark just got in his car and drove around 
to the front of the store. 
At that point he parked in front and came inside to 
tell me what he had just seen. 
Q So after you heard that what did you do? 
A I talked to - Craig is a grocery manager and he's 
well versed in stopping shoplifters and so I said, well, 
let's go out and see what's going on. So the three of us 
walked back out to the parking lot. 
Q Do you see anyone in the courtroom today that you 
saw in the parking lot that day? 
A 
Q 
Yes, sir. 
Will you describe where that person is and what 
they're wearing? 
A It's Mr. Hinman, he's there with the dark striped 
shirt and a blue patterned tie. 
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THE COURT: The record reflects identification of 
the defendant. 
Q (BY MR. CARLSON) What did you see the defendant 
do? 
A I approached the car because Mark, the employee, 
pointed it out and said that's the car there. I walked µp to 
the rear of the car and was able to walk up on the passenger 
side of it because the car had been backed into a parking 
stall along the sidewalk and so I was able to get right up 
without being noticed and able to look in over the shoulder 
of the passenger into the passenger compartment of the car. 
Q Okay, what did you see? 
A I noticed a male who was Mr. Hinmon sitting in the 
passenger seat and an unknown female sitting in the driver 
seat and from my vantage point, it wasn't real clear, Mr. 
Hinman was sitting there with like a towel across his lap and 
he was doing something, manipulating something down there 
that I really couldn't see. So I bent down closer to try to 
get a gooder, a better view of what was going on. 
What happened next? Q 
A At that point the female noticed that I was leaning 
down and looking in the car because she was looking over 
towards him and she seemed startled and he turned and looked 
at me at the same time. 
Q What did you do then? 
5 
~: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A At that point, I told him, there was two things I 
said; one·was don't move and don't do anything stupid. And I 
was in uniform, the Harmon's uniform, it's not the uniform I 
wear now -
Q How does the Harmon's uniform look? 
A It's a navy blue short sleeved shirt, it's a 
uniform shirt. It's got patches on the sleeves that say 
public safety. It's got a 6-pointed gold star on the chest, 
same position as this and a gold name badge on the other 
side. I was also wearing dark blue tactical trousers, the 
same gun belt I'm wearing now and black boots. 
Q And so after you said don't move, don't do anything 
stupid, what happened next? 
A Well, I could see the startled look on Mr. Hinmon's 
face and at that point he grabbed for whatever was in the 
center of the towel and I still hadn't seen it and shoved his 
hands towards the floorboards between his legs in the car and 
at that point my thought was either (a) he's hiding 
contraband; or he's going for a weapon. 
Q So what did you do at that point? 
A So I reached in to try to control his hands because 
that's what I would do, you know, to protect myself. And 
once I got in there and got ahold of him, it was a very 
awkward position to be in and the two guys that were with me 
tried to open the car door but it was welded shut or somehow 
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secured so that you couldn't open the passenger door. 
Q 
A 
Were you saying anything at the time? 
At that point, as soon as Mr. Hinman went to the 
floor and I grabbed him, I said, uPolice officer, you're-
under arrest," and he continued to struggle. So then I told 
him just give me your hands and - anyway - so, but he 
continued to struggle and he wasn't combative and trying to 
punch me or anything but trying to struggle to keep out of my 
control. 
Q So when you said give me your hands, did he give 
you his hands? 
A 
Q 
A 
No, he would not. 
So what happened next? 
So, we continued in that position for a moment and 
he was struggling to keep his hands down and I was trying to 
get hold of him to control him. But it was like I said, a 
very awkward position and at that time he broke, he got his 
right hand free. Let's see, just before that we were 
struggling and he was, he said, Start the car, and I assumed 
to the girl who was sitting there. 
Q And what did you do at that point? 
A He was head down, I was on top of him trying to 
hold his hands. Wher. he said that I looked over at her 
because were like eye to eye at that point and I said, Don't 
start that car, and she put her hands up and indicated she 
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wasn't going to start the car. 
So then we struggled again for a moment and he got 
his right hand free and he reached up towards her with a 
clenched fist and he said, Eat this. And I looked over at 
her and I said don't eat that and she was still - at that 
point she started to cry and Craig who was with me, ran 
around to the passenger side and opened the passenger door 
and was getting her out of the car when at that point Mr. 
Hinman struggled pretty hard and twisted up over to where his 
head was basically in the back of the car, his feet were down 
11 in the passenger side and I no longer had control of his 
12 right hand but I had ahold of his left hand and I heard Craig 
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say that he's trying to swallow something. 
Q So what did you do? 
A And I was - he was resisting us, you know, give me 
your hands, you're under arrest. Those are the kind of 
things I kept saying to him, those exact words. Craig was 
trying to get ahold of his right hand and I was trying to 
maintain control of his left hand and I eventually got his 
left hand freed from kind of underneath him, pulled that back 
I 
but then I couldn't reach my handcuffs. .So I said to Mark 
who was behind me, I said, Would you grab my handcuffs? And 
so he pulled those out and put them in through the window 
and we were able to get a cuff onto this left hand. In the 
meantime Craig had been fighting to get control of his right 
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hand and eventually got control of his right hand and pulled 
it to the back and we were able to get him handcuffed at that 
point. 
Q Did you call the police? 
A Yeah, once we - at that point Mr. Hinman basically 
quit struggling. I came around to the driver's side and we 
brought him out through the driver's side of the car as I 
recall and, umrnm, we ahhh, took him over to the sidewalk. And 
Craig had seen him - he told me this - he's seen him trying 
to throw things in his mouth and he ~ecovered one of the 
items off of the backseat. 
Q Did you seize this item? 
A It was a small little balloon is what it was and so 
he gave that to me and we had removed Mr. Hinman and put him 
out on the sidewalk. I just did a quick cursory search to 
make sure he didn't have any weapons on him and sat him down. 
He was just wearing a pair of shorts and a tee shirt and his 
tennis shoes and socks and I pulled his shoes off to make 
sure he didn't have any like handcuff keys or anything hidden 
in his socks or in his shoes and sat him down on the sidewalk 
and at that point we called for the Draper Police Department. 
MR. CARLSON: Thank you, I have no further 
questions at this time. 
THE COURT: Ms. Chesnut. 
MS. CHESNUT: Just a few questions, Your Honor. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MS. CHESNUT: 
Q Now, you've talked about a Craig that was with you 
during this whole incident, do you mean Craig the grocery 
manager that you talked about? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Do you know his last name? 
A Off the top of my head, no. 
Q And is he any kind of security at Harmon's or is he 
simply a store employee? 
A He's a store employee whose worked at Harmon's for 
many years and he's had numerous incidences where he's had to 
help with shoplifters. 
Q Okay. Now, when you approached this car was he by 
your side; behind you; not there yet? Where was he? 
A He was behind me. Both he and the other employee 
whose name is Mark, they were kind of behind me watching to 
see what I was going to do. 
Q Okay. Now, when you first came up you said you saw 
a towel in Mr. Hinmon's lap. 
A Yeah, I believe it was a towel. It was a white 
covered piece of cloth across his lap. 
Q And where were his hands? 
A His hands were down manipulating something that was 
in the towel or on top of the towel. 
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Q Okay, could you tell whether it was under or over 
the towel? 
A It appeared to me he was doing something that was 
on top of the towel that was on his lap. 
Q Okay. And could you see what the something was? 
A I could not. 
Q Now, you said that it was at that point you said 
don't move and don't do anything stupid? 
A Yes. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
And was the window down? 
The window was down. 
The passenger window? 
Passenger window, yes. 
Q And when you said that you said he shoved the towel 
down between his knees? 
A He appeared to grasp it and shove it down like 
that. 
Q When he did that did you see any other object other 
than the towel? 
A No, no, but his actions prompted me to believe that 
he had contraband or something in there that he didn't want 
me to see. 
Q Okay. Okay, so you believed he probably had 
contraband in the towel? 
A Yeah. 
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·-·----···· ---------------, 
Q Now you said that you were - you described what you 
were wearing at the time, the navy shirt with the star and 
the patches and the name tag. Now you said you were also 
wearing the gun belt you're wearing now. Now, what gun belt 
is that? 
A It's this one. 
Q Okay. Now is that your DWR uniform you're wearing 
right now? 
A 
Q 
This is the DWR uniform, yes. 
Okay. So you were actually wearing the gun beit 
for your DWR uniform on that day with Mr. Hinman? 
A Yes. 
And I assume there's a gun in that belt, right? 
Yes, there is. 
Is there also a nightstick? 
Q 
A 
Q 
A Yes. Well, there's a baton; there's pepper spray; 
ummm, extra magazines; two sets of handcuffs; pocket knife; a 
radio holder, several things. 
Q Okay. Okay, now, you said that - you mentioned you 
thought he might have contraband. You also said something 
about safety. Now what did you mean by that? 
A Well, as soon as he drove his hands to the floor, 
and I can't see what he's doing with his hands, my immediate 
concern is .for my safety or anybody else's for that matter, 
that he might be reaching for a weapon and so at that point 
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my first instinct is to - I've got to get control of his-
hands just in case he has a weapon. 
Q Okay. Now is this sort of general law enforcement 
training that you need to see somebody's hands or they may 
have a weapon or was there something specific about this 
situation; you were told he had a weapon, you know, something 
like -
A No one told me that but it is standard training for 
police officers to maintain either visual or physical contact 
with someone's hands for your own safety, yeah, because 
that's what they use usually to grab weapons and hurt you. 
Q Okay, so in this case because you couldn't see his 
hands, due to your training you need to see those, that's why 
you were worried about safety? 
A That's, yeah, that was one of my concerns. The 
other one was that he had contraband that he was trying to 
hide or get rid of or do something with. 
Q Okay. Yeah, I understand about the contraband but 
just to clarify, so you hadn't seen any kind of a weapon in 
the car or with him? 
A No, but a common place would be to hide it under 
the seat or by his feet somewhere where he could just reach 
and get it. So ... 
Q 
A 
Right, right. But you hadn't seen anything -
No. 
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Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
- up to that point? 
No. 
And someone hadn't told you they saw a weapon? 
No. 
Had you ever met him before? 
Not that I'm aware. 
Q So you had no prior experience with him? 
A No. 
Q Okay, now you said that after, after he drove his 
hands down, you went to grab his hands, right? 
A Yes. 
Q Now at that time did you also say, uPolice, you are 
under arrest"? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Okay, it was right then when he shoved his hands 
down between his knees? 
Right. A 
Q Okay. And did you say that just one time or several 
times? 
I said that several times. A 
Q Okay. And did you say that while you were trying to 
grab his hands? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Now, now you said that at one point this 
Craig came to help you; is that right? 
14 
."-,., 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And had you struggled for a minute before 
Craig came to help you? 
A Yeah, because there was no room on the passenger 
side for more than one person and we found shortly into this 
struggle that the door wouldn't open. So Craig had to leave 
the passenger side and walk around to the driver's side. 
Q Now was it Craig or Mark who got the female out of 
the -
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
the car? 
It was Craig. 
Okay, now you said that Mr. Hinman was handcuffed. 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Was that before or after he, you removed him from 
A He was handcuffed in the car and then removed from 
the car and put on the sidewalk. 
Q Okay. And you used your handcuffs to do that I 
assume? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Had police arrived by that point? 
A No. 
Q Did you ever see whether Mr. Hinman had any object 
other than the towel? 
A 
Q 
No. 
Okay, so after you got Mr. Hinman out of the car 
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and set him on the curb, what did you do after that? 
A Well, I spoke with Craig, for one thing, and asked 
him what he had seen and he told me that he saw Mr. Hinman 
trying to throw items into his mouth, one of them had bounced 
off and was laying on the seat and Craig had recovered that 
and he handed it to me and it was a small balloon. But he 
said, he told me that he thought he'd gotten some of it in 
his mouth and swallowed it, so ... 
Q 
A 
Q 
sidewalk? 
A 
very much. 
Okay, so Craig handed you this balloon -
Yes. 
- it was after Mr. Hinman was handcuffed on the 
Yes, uh-huh (affirmative). 
MS. CHESNUT: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Any followup counsel? 
MR. CARLSON: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Officer, you may step down. Thank you 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: You may call your next witness. 
MR. CARLSON: Yes, Your Honor, the State calls 
Officer Willie and while he's coming the State would present 
State's Exhibits 1 and 2 which are two 1102 sworn statements 
for the Court. 
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THE COURT: Okay. Any objection to those? 
MS. CHESNUT: No, no objection. 
THE COURT: Very good. Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 
2 will be entered. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2 received) 
MR. CARLSON: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Sir, if you'll come right up here 
please and raise your right hand. 
DUSTIN WILLIE 
having been first duly sworn, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 
THE COURT: Sir, if you'll be seated right at the 
witness stand. 
And once you're comfortably seated, go ahead and 
pull yourself up to that microphone there and that microphone 
is flexible so bend it however it's comfortable for you. If 
you'd please state your name and spell your last name for the 
record. 
THE WITNESS: Officer Dustin Willie, W-I-L-L-I-E. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Counsel? 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CARLSON: 
Q How long have you been a police officer? 
A Since 2005. 
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Q Were you - what jurisdiction are you a police 
officer for? 
A I'm a Draper City Police Officer. 
Were you on duty on September 19 th of last year? 
Yes, I was. 
Q 
A 
Q And while on duty that day were you called to 11400 
South 700 East? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
questions. 
Yes. 
Was that in Salt Lake County? 
Yes, it is. 
Were you given a balloon? 
Yes, I was. 
What did you do with that balloon? 
I field tested it for drugs. 
And what was the result of that field test? 
Tested positive for heroin. 
MR. CARLSON: Thank you. I have no further 
THE COURT: Ms. Chesnut? 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MS. CHESNUT: 
Q When you arrived at the scene did you see Mr. 
Hinman there? 
A 
Q 
Yes, I did. 
And what was he doing when you arrived? 
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A 
Q 
A 
He was seated on the sidewalk, handcuffed. 
Was anyone with him? 
Officer Loken was with him. There were three other 
Draper employee officers that arrived before me, so they were 
all somewhere close by also. 
Q Okay. And you said Officer Loken, are you familiar 
with Officer Loken? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Only from this incident. 
No other situations you've handled with him? 
No. 
Now, did you have any kind of interaction with Mr. 
Hinmon that day? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
to jail? 
A 
very much. 
Yes, I did. 
Did you take him to jail? 
Yes, I did. 
Did he, did he resist you in any way in taking him 
No. 
MS. CHESNUT: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: Anything else, counsel? 
MR. CARLSON: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Officer, you may step down, thank you 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
MR. CARLSON: The State has no further witnesses. 
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THE COURT: Very good. Ms. Chesnut, do you plan to 
call any witnesses today? 
MS. CHESNUT: If I could have just a minute? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MS. CHESNUT: I've advised Mr. Hinman of his right 
to testify, advised he not testify and he's taking that 
advice. 
THE COURT: Is that true, sir? 
DEFENDANT HINMON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. If that's the case, 
counsel, any argument? 
MR. CARLSON: Briefly, Your Honor. It's fairly 
clear that the balloon that came out of the defendant's hand 
was heroin, field tested positive for heroin and that he 
attempted to have his companion swallow it, attempted to 
swallow it himself, so for Count 1 the State would argue 
there is probable cause to go forward. 
For Count 2 I'd ask the Court to specifically focus 
not on the defendant's behavior toward Officer Willie but 
towards Officer Loken. Officer Loken is a peace officer, he 
made it clear that he was an officer by stating so and the 
defendant was under arrest. So a reasonable person would 
know that the officer was attempting to perform a detention. 
The officer also told him to give him his hands which he 
refused to do. 
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....---------------------------------------·-· ... 
THE COURT: Very good. 
Any argument Ms. Chesnut? 
MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, we'll submit. 
THE COURT: All right. I find there's probable 
cause to believe the crimes were committed and further that 
the defendant committed the crime. I'm going to bind this 
case over to Judge Charlene Barlow. 
Ms. Chesnut, would you prefer one or three weeks? 
MS. CHESNUT: Three weeks if we could. 
THE COURT: Three weeks. Let's set it for the 3rd 
of March at 8:30 in the morning in front of Judge Charlene 
Barlow, not guilty pleas will be entered on behalf of your 
client. 
Now, Mr. Carlson, you may come and retrieve your 
exhibits. 
MR. CARLSON: Thank you, Your Honor. That was the 
3~ of March at 8:30? 
THE COURT: Third of March at 8:30, yes. 
MR. CARLSON: Thank you. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
-c-
21 
' DEFENDANT'S 
3 EXHIBIT 
,.. i k 
. r City Police Department 
vVITNESS STATEMENT 
Case Number 
N~e ,J. I Date of Birth 1 Home Phone 
1 f'/vr1 f¼/111?.5 ju?-/ S- <iJ o1_ I 
'. Street Addres7 , f / 1 Mobile Phone 
: 1;;06;; Hec(IA ~,'d_e, e C:.:ew lf' ! ff O I-0 ?~ - ? 5 > I 
!Ci)Y, 7 I State I Zip Code I Work Phone 
: f/,q/)er {)--f- ! (j'-/{);) r) i C/C)!- 4G >b- f'C;-J / 
J Driver's Lic~nse/1D Number 
'. 16&975~~ 
1 E-moll Address I '2,P:)r.cc,,'nr f[! VCt /:do .C0!'-1 
" Details of Events: ·-----------------
' I , 
----........,._;_..<.....L.-1-.....;~c..- G~_ikt~ 
I 
I 
·---. 
t__ ____________________________________ _;i 
i 
··-Pursuant le.. R:.111: 11·J2. Utah Rules or E·-,iaencf anc Se:::ticn 76-8-50~.5. Utah Code: Annotntec: You are hereby nolif,~d 
1 t:-.~~- the s:atemel'll!: r.:ac~ hereir. may be p:-eseme= tc & magistrate or judge in lieu of y:iur swom testim~:w at a 
prelirr,inar; examination. Any false statement you mal<e and that you do not believe to be true mav be subiect le 
l criminal ounishment as a Class A Misdemeanor. 
l,1'1._,, J., !? ----. (...- I_, I have re:id and understal}._d the ~~:ltemc:-,t above: ~ A ... •✓-~-,;/ Date: .' _.,-i 1 - ' ,, 
•-. 
- . 
ice Department 
WITNESS STATEMENT 
Date of Birth 
,c.:.. : ,. ... J~ l 2 -/ "'7- c;;; i 
,._,_/ S-ffeet Ad_<:!f ess 
It;: -,_ c;-:·u c 
I &--- DI \)c1. i -:., y ~•c le) Dr . 
City 
D 4oc.r: 
Driver's License/ID Number 
I -2 c•✓, / __ ./ -:;:, . 
--, L,)'1..:, 'c'°-'2:? :> 
S'tate Zip Code 
v f <s<-tozo 
E-mail Address 
Details of Events: 
Case Number 
') / '·") L(l ) ·-
Home Phone 
Mobile Phone 
a,,,,) c,· - ,,..~ r ·-. i/--,, . - I)½° '- - , • 6 -S 
Work Phone 
So I - c;- 7 '.'.'.:' -- - 9c::;:· ) I 
- /'= ' 
Ci'. .,· "?_ • .,...·, - ... . I- ·,.,,,.., # \,-, ~ - C , __ .,, I - -~ 
' - . _,._, , ~- r; ~ . 
1-:.:10::::..:C:. ..!' f..:::~,:;.....a~~......!,_~_:::=~1::.-!....!=....:...!c=.~___:•:.:.,-:"._:,1:.!.!=::C c...: --1..f.}..,~.;:._- 'k\J l-,o- (- l,,,e r c) i .// 
01, f-&-- 'L(worH.-, ;,..:...,\-,..."' "\ 
' . ..._J 
I'\ ~Gt.d )_.,, 
a...,•Gf 
( o, {; i-1--1 ~ 
; .J~ .r-- -~-6 c-/4... I- r...,,,· • .., ,, ,,...,... ,:-) -· 
( 'C /./\GU·~ /,..\. ,_~ c,_ ,-1..-, /- l,,. cc:....r 
Cu- +- j . ;--1 <.:.. / (:',1. re 
' 
fl c... 
Pursuant to Rule 1102, Utah Rules or Evidence and Section 76-8-504.5, Utah Code Annotated: You are hereby notified 
that the statements made herein may be presented to a magif trate or judge ln Ji.e~ your sworn testimony at a 
preliminary examination. An false statement cu mak&'find thnt Oll do,·not believe to be true ma be sub·ect to 
criminal punishment as a Class A Misdemeanor. / /. ,,..,-- L-, 
1 have read and understand the statement above: {__., '<, \ l Date:ie\, / q.- / '7 
u 
